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segregation, blacks and whites with the same socio-economic characteristics should live in more integrated neighborhoods when they own a home compared to when they rent. In fact this is the primary finding reported in this paper. The other major finding of this paper is that the degree to which racial segregation decreases with homeownership varies substantially with other socioeconomic characteristics, particularly educational attainment. These two results suggest that discrimination is an important factor contributing to black-white segregation and that the effect of discrimination on segregation varies considerably across individuals.
This fusion of information found in audit studies to a nationally representative data set permits for the first time the construction of direct evidence on the relationship between the incidence of racial discrimination in housing and housing segregation. In contrast, previous research on discrimination as a cause of segregation (Taeuber [1968] ; Kain [1976 Kain [ , 1986 ; and Massey and Denton [1993] ) relies on indirect evidence derived from the residual method. The residual method models segregation by explicitly controlling for factors (typically income) other than discrimination.
It then assigns the portion of segregation not explained by the model, or the residual, to discrimination. A more detailed critique of the residual method is presented in Section II.
An empirical estimate of how discrimination affects segregation may be of interest to policymakers and social scientists who are concerned with the causes of racial inequalities. Recent empirical studies suggest that racial segregation in housing may be partially responsible for the relatively poor social and economic outcomes of minorities compared to whites. Cutler and Glaeser [1997] estimate that a one standard deviation decline black-white segregation would narrow the black-white gap in schooling (high school and college graduation rates), employment (labor force participation rates and earnings) and single parenthood by about one-third. Furthermore, recent reviews (Kain [1992] ; Holzer [1991] ) of the spatial mismatch literature indicate that the employment prospects of central city residents, especially young and unskilled laborers, have been adversely affected by a geographic shift in the location of entry level jobs away from traditionally black and Hispanic central cities and toward typically white suburban areas. Thus by isolating minorities to low job growth areas, racial segregation increases spatial mismatch and contributes to poor labor market outcomes. Other studies have linked high levels of racial segregation to poor educational attainment (Orfield [1993 (Orfield [ , 1997 ), increased infant and adult mortality rates (La Viest [1989 , 1993 ; Polednak [1991 Polednak [ , 1993 ; and Collins and Williams [1999] ), increased homicide rates (Peterson and Krivo [1993, 1999] ) and even decreases in voter turnout (Cohen and Dawson [1983] ).
A unique aspect of this paper is its use of panel data to measure segregation. While previous studies of segregation have used cross-sectional data, mostly from the decennial census, this study uses a confidential supplement to the PSID. Using the PSID instead of data from the decennial census has several advantages. First, most nationally representative panel data sets, such as the PSID, have more detailed information on individual characteristics compared to data derived from the decennial census. For confidentiality reasons, data from the decennial census are limited to race, census tract, and one socioeconomic variable of interest, typically income. The advantage of using the confidential supplement of the PSID is that researchers are able to control for a wider range of factors when modeling racial segregation. Second, panel data allow the use of individual specific (fixed) effects. Using fixed-effects in a model of segregation is appealing because under a reasonable assumption they can be interpreted as preferences over the racial composition of one's neighborhood. The necessary assumption is that these preferences are stable over time. Controlling for these preferences is important because presumably voluntary segregation is an important aspect of black-white segregation.
1 Thus, the researcher who uses panel data can simultaneously control for very detailed individual-level socioeconomic characteristics, the preferences of the individual and the discrimination rate by using homeownership as a proxy.
Furthermore, evidence is presented here that the omission of fixed-effects leads to a large bias in the model's parameter estimates. This bias is severe enough that the estimated effect of discrimination on segregation is reduced to, on average, zero when fixed-effects are ignored but is quantitatively large and statistically significant when fixed-effects are added.
Previous research on racial segregation has relied exclusively on cross-sectional data, such as the decennial census, most likely because current measures of segregation are defined over the population of a geographic region, such as a metropolitan area, and therefore can only be applied to data sets from censuses. For this reason, prior research on racial segregation measures has ignored nationally representative survey data such as the PSID that includes samples from many different geographic regions but no population counts. In order to overcome this limitation, a new measure of 1 See Schelling [1971] for a discussion of how black and white preferences over the racial composition of one=s 4 racial segregation is developed in this paper, which is defined over a nationally representative sample taken across several metropolitan areas.
The essay is organized as follows. Section II provides a critique of the residual method.
Section III reviews evidence from audit studies and shows that the rate of discrimination in rental housing is substantially higher than in owner-occupied housing. Section IV develops a segregation measure that can be applied to data sampled from many different geographic regions. Section V discusses the data and sample restrictions. A simple method for calculating the new segregation measure is found in section VI. Section VII lays out the estimation strategy and presents the fixedeffects results. Section VIII compares the fixed-effects results to results obtained when the PSID is treated as a cross-section. Section IX concludes.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE RESIDUAL METHOD
Several researchers have speculated that housing segregation could be reduced through policies that lower the discrimination rate in housing. Yet this claim relies on indirect evidence from studies that utilize the residual method (for example, Taeuber [1968] ; Kain [1976 Kain [ , 1986 ; and Massey and Denton [1993] ), an empirical strategy that estimates the effect of inter-racial economic differences on racial segregation and then assigns the remaining unexplained component to housing discrimination.
These studies assume that the effect of discrimination on segregation can be measured by examining the segregation of blacks and whites that have similar social or economic characteristics.
The assumption used in these studies is that discrimination is the only cause of segregation that remains after controlling for inter-racial economic differences. Typically, such studies construct a segregation measure 2 conditional on a single dimension of economic status, usually income. For each income group, this segregation measure is computed for all black and white individuals who fall within a given range of income. For instance, for 30 different MSAs Massey and Denton [1993] neighborhood may interact to produce voluntary segregation in housing.
2 The most commonly used segregation measure is the dissimilarity index, a measure that is bounded between zero and one and represents the percentage of blacks that would have to move in order to achieve full integration. See Cortese, Falk and Cohen (1976) for a fuller discussion of segregation indices.
calculate a segregation measure for blacks and whites who have annual incomes less than $2,500, between $25,000 and $27,500, and more than $50,000. On average the segregation measure is equal to 74.4 for blacks and whites in the low-income category, 66.7 for those with incomes in the middle range and 72.8 for those with high incomes. The finding that higher levels of economic status do not result in substantially lower levels of racial segregation then forms the basis for the claim that discrimination is the principal cause of segregation.
There are three important limitations to this methodology. First, housing segregation is caused not only by economic inequality and discrimination but also by other important factors, such as voluntary segregation. One would expect such factors to be in the "residual" segregation not explained by inter-racial income differences. Thus, the effect of discrimination on segregation is not identified.
Second, even if the residual method could identify the total effect of discrimination on segregation, the effect of a discrete reduction in discrimination on segregation would not be known.
Causation and responsiveness are logically separate concepts. For instance, if a zero price implies infinite demand for a good, it does not follow that all price reductions for that good will result in an elastic change in demand. Likewise, while it might be the case that discrimination is largely responsible for black-white segregation, it does not follow that a policy that effectively reduces, but does not eliminate, discrimination would substantially decrease housing segregation. The function that maps discrimination into segregation may have a few flat spots, even if it passes through the origin. Thus, even if the residual method accurately identifies the aggregate effect of discrimination on segregation, it would not identify the effect of a policy that reduces but does not eliminate discrimination.
Third, the effect of discrimination on segregation may vary across different groups within minority communities. By construction, the residual method cannot be sensitive to this issue.
According to this technique, if the segregation levels of high and low income blacks are similar (different) then discrimination is said to be an important (unimportant) determinant of segregation.
Yet this comparison requires that high and low income blacks be equally responsive to discrimination. To the extent that this responsiveness varies by economic status, the residual method mis-measures the aggregate effect of discrimination on segregation.
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The methodology presented here addresses these shortcomings. First, because the PSID contains detailed information on individuals, the estimates of segregation in this paper are able to control for a richer set of socioeconomic variables compared to previous studies. Second, the proxy used in this case corresponds to a discrete change in the discrimination rate that may be similar to a change in enforcement policy that produces a moderate decline in the discrimination rate. If so, the estimates found in this paper might be used by policymakers to predict the possible impact of increased enforcement of fair housing laws on segregation. Third, by interacting a proxy for the discrimination rate with socioeconomic characteristics, it is possible to identify how the impact of discrimination on segregation might vary with these variables of interest.
III. THE AUDIT EVIDENCE
The only direct evidence on the rate of discrimination in housing comes from audit studies.
A fair housing audit pairs a white tester with a black or Hispanic tester. Each tester in a pair is given a similar false identity and visits the same rental unit or realtor. At the end of their visit, each tester independently logs information about their visit, including information presented to them regarding the availability of housing. In the HUD supervised audits, discrimination is said to occur if the black or Hispanic tester is treated less favorably than the white tester in at least one category while the white tester is always treated at least as well as the black or Hispanic tester. The audit is termed ambiguous and no discrimination is said to occur if both testers were treated less favorably than the other in at least one category.
HUD has conducted two national studies of discrimination in housing, one in 1977 (Wienk et al. [1979] ) and one in the summer of 1989 (Yinger [1991] ). The 1977 HUD study inspired a number of local housing authorities to conduct their own audit studies during the 1980s. Galster [1990] reviews these audit studies. These three studies comprise the only nationwide evidence of the pattern of housing discrimination in the United States.
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There are several dimensions along which the treatment of auditors is recorded: housing availability, credit assistance and sales effort are three examples. This paper focuses on discrimination in housing availability because it is considered the most severe form of discrimination in housing. According to Wienk et al. [1979] :
The principal focus of this study is on housing availability for two reasons. First, differential treatment on housing availability is a clear violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Second, differential treatment on housing availability is the most fundamental form of discriminatory practice that a black apartment seeker might encounter. If a rental agent told one auditor that no apartments were available but told the other auditor that something was available, it matters little whether both auditors received the same treatment for each of the other items. Therefore, differential treatment on apartment availability is considered most important. 3 (p. ES-6 -ES-7)
Other types of behavior that qualify as differential treatment in housing availability include differences in the type of housing made available, the number of units inspected, information on waiting lists and the number of units shown. This contrasts with discrimination in housing availability in the sales market. This type of discrimination occurs when a realtor falsely claims that a home is not for sale, offers multiple listing directories to minority customers at a lower rate compared to white customers, or restricts the number of homes offered for inspection or actually inspected to minority customers compared to white customers.
A key issue in the measurement of discrimination is distinguishing random unfavorable treatment from systematic discrimination (Heckman [1992] , Yinger [1992] ). The former may be the result of random factors such as a realtor's mood or the time of day and likely would have little or no effect on racial segregation in housing since both minority and whites would receive such treatment with equal probability. The latter, however, is likely the result of prejudice against minorities and presumably can have a large effect on racial segregation in housing because it systematically excludes minorities from certain neighborhoods. Random unequal treatment can cause individual instances of unequal treatment to overstate or understate the presence of systematic discrimination.
For instance, random factors may cause a discriminating landlord to favor a minority auditor during a particular audit or may cause a non-discriminating landlord to favor the white auditor.
Two methods are used in audit studies to discern the rate of discrimination in data that report instead the rate of unfavorable treatment. The first method assumes that minority auditors receive favorable treatment only as a result of random variation in the behavior of realtors and rental agents.
Thus, the discrimination rate is taken to be the difference of the rate of favorable treatment for white auditors and the rate of favorable treatment for minority auditors. Suppose, for example, that white auditors were favored in 30 percent of the audits and minority auditors were favored 10 percent of the time. Then this methodology would imply a discrimination rate equal to 20 percent. This "net incidence" measure is reported as a measure of discrimination in all three major national studies of racial discrimination. 4 Yinger [1991] points out that the "net incidence" measure may understate the actual rate of discrimination. As previously noted, random factors may lead a discriminating realtor or rental agent to favor a minority auditor, yet using the "net incidence" measure such an audit would not be counted as discriminatory. Yinger proposes constructing a measure of systematic discrimination using the predicted values of a logistic regression. The dependent variable is the probability that a minority auditor is treated less favorably, more favorably or the same as the white tester and the independent variables include characteristics of the testers, realtors and rental agents. If unfavorable treatment of the minority auditor is the most likely of the three outcomes then the audit is classified as discriminatory.
The findings of these studies are presented in table 1. The 1977 HUD study and Galster's review of audits by local housing authorities report only the "net incidence" discrimination rate measure. Both the "net incidence" and logit measure are reported for the 1989 HUD study. Housing audits conducted by HUD in 1977 in 40 different metropolitan areas found that blacks confront racial discrimination 27 percent of the time in rental units and 15 percent of the time in owneroccupied housing (Wienk et al. [1979] ). HUD repeated the 1977 study in the summer of 1989 using 20 metropolitan areas. Using the logit measure, discrimination in housing availability against blacks occurred in 46.9 percent of the rental units and 34.2 percent of the sales units in 1989. In that same follow-up study, discrimination occurred 21.3 percent of the time in rental units and 18.0 percent of the time in sales units according to the "net incidence" measure. Galster [1990] reviewed the results of 71 housing audits carried out by local housing authorities during the 1980s. The total number of audit studies available to calculate the rate of discrimination against blacks in housing availability is unfortunately lower. A number of the audit studies focus on discrimination against Hispanics and so are not applicable. Furthermore, many of the written reports that Galster received in response to his survey were incomplete. Nevertheless
Galster found that the incidence of racial discrimination against blacks is 47 percent in rental markets and 21 percent in owner-occupied housing markets. for an equality of means tests for both of these studies is 0.00. However, the p-value for an equality of means test for the 1989 HUD study is higher (0.07). In the last row of table 2 an equality of means test is conducted in which the data from the three studies are combined. In this case, the pvalue for the equality of means test is 0.00. Thus, even though the 1989 HUD audits appear to provide the weakest evidence of higher discrimination rates in rental markets, the cumulative evidence from all three audits taken together strongly indicates that black renters face higher rates of discrimination than blacks searching in the sales market.
These results are not surprising given the different financial incentives and the differences in black-white contact after a contract is signed in the two markets. Most homeowners have a relatively large percentage of wealth at risk when they sell their house compared to the percentage of their wealth that apartment owners risk when attempting to rent a single unit (see Eller and Wallace [1995] , Table A , page 3). Thus, risk averse, racially biased homeowners should be more willing to sell to blacks than similarly risk averse, racially biased apartment owners would be willing to rent to blacks. Moreover, many rental agents are salaried while realtors work on commission.
5 The method used here is the standard equality of means of two independent samples. The random variable in question in these three audit studies, whether or not an individual experiences discrimination, follows a Bernoulli process. A Bernoulli process is fully characterized by its mean and thus any assumption that the populations of two Bernoulli processes have the same mean necessarily implies that these two populations have the same variance. For this reason the test used here is an equality of means test in which it is also assumed that the two samples have the same variance (Greene, [1997] ).
Furthermore, when a white owner sells a house to a black buyer, black-white contact is limited to negotiations and closing. After closing the deal the buyer and seller may never meet again. In contrast, a landlord and tenant have a relationship after the rental agreement is signed. Therefore, white homeowners and realtors with equal tastes for discrimination have more financial and personal incentives to sell to black buyers than similar rental agents have to rent to black tenants.
IV. MEASURING SEGREGATION IN PANEL DATA
Traditional measures of segregation 6 are defined over geographic regions, such as a metropolitan area. Typically these measures are used with census data to assign an index of segregation to major metropolitan areas in the United States. Since these measures are defined over geographic areas they can be used only with data that provides information on all locales within a geographic area. As such, these measures cannot be applied to nationally representative survey data.
Since this study uses data from the PSID, a nationally representative survey data set, a new segregation measure is needed. Let ∆(X) be defined as the difference in the average proportion of blacks in the neighborhoods of observationally equivalent black and white individuals or, mathematically,
where b is the percentage of blacks in a person's neighborhood, X is a vector of socioeconomic variables such as income and education, B is a dummy variable equal to one if a person is black and 6 The most popular traditional measure of segregation is the dissimilarity index (D) which is defined as
where the summation is over neighborhoods j = 1, 2 …, n within the metropolitan area, p j is the number of black people living in neighborhood j, w j is the number of white people living in neighborhood j, P is the number of black people in the MSA and W is the number of white people in the MSA. This index ranges from zero to one and is commonly interpreted as the proportion of minority individuals who would need to move in order for each neighborhood to have an equal proportion of minorities. This measure cannot be applied to a typical panel data set because these data sets usually do not provide information on the minority and total populations in each neighborhood within a metropolitan area (Taeuber, [1968] ). the expectation is taken over individuals in the sample. ∆(X) range from -1 to 1 and applies to individuals with the same set of socioeconomic characteristics X, rather than to individuals in the same metropolitan area. 7 Thus of racial segregation is simply an artifact of economic segregation then ∆(X) should be equal to zero.
∆(X) can also be used to measure segregation across different housing markets. Let ∆ r (X) and ∆ h (X) denote the ∆(X) segregation measure taken over rental and owner-occupied housing units, respectively. These two quantities are defined as
where R is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual rents. Then, provided three assumptions detailed below, the difference ∆ r (X)  -∆ h (X) quantifies the effect that the additional discrimination found in rental compared to sales markets has on segregation.
If one assumes that 1) segregation due to sorting is constant across rental and owneroccupied housing markets; 2) the function that maps discrimination into segregation is the same across both rental and owner-occupied housing; and 3) the discrimination and voluntary sorting components of segregation are additive, then ∆ r (X) -∆ h (X) will measure only the increase in 7 ∆(X) is a modification of the Isolation index (E bb ) which is given by
where p j is the number of blacks in neighborhood j, P is the population of blacks in the MSA, B is a dummy variable equal to one is an individual is black and b j is the proportion of residents of neighborhood j who are black. Subtracting from this mean the same expectation taken over whites yields a quantity (∆) equal to the average difference in the proportion of blacks in a black and white person's neighborhood ]
To account for differences in economic status between whites and blacks, convert the above unconditional expectations into conditional expectations,
where X is a vector of variables describing the economic status of a given individual. segregation due to the higher discrimination rate found in rental relative to owner-occupied housing.
where α r and α h are the discrimination rates in the rental and sales markets, s is the component of segregation due to voluntary sorting and δ(α r ) and δ(α h ) are the components of segregation due to the rates of discrimination in the rental and sales markets respectively. If Provided that ∆ r (X) -∆ h (X) is positive, this difference can also be interpreted as a lower bound on the decrease in segregation that would occur from eliminating discrimination in the rental housing market. Let the hypothetical change in segregation in the rental market due to an elimination of racial discrimination be given by ∆ r (X) -∆ 0 (X), where ∆ 0 (X) is the level of segregation corresponding to a discrimination rate equal to zero. Because one would expect a positive relationship between the discrimination rate and segregation, it seems reasonable to assume
V. DATA AND SAMPLE RESTRICTIONS
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The data used in this study comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID contains information on a sample of approximately 37,500 U.S. individuals (men, women and children) and their families beginning in 1968. Because the original intent of the study was to facilitate the study of poverty, the PSID over-samples low-income individuals. The core data is collected annually and contains economic and demographic information. Special attention is given to income amounts and sources, employment history, family composition and residential location.
However, the only geographic data found in the core data set is aggregated at the state level.
A confidential supplemental data set, the PSID Geocode Match Files, has been acquired with permission from the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan. This data set provides a detailed portrait of the neighborhood environment of the PSID respondents from [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] . The data set is unique because of the level of disaggregation of the neighborhood variables.
The PSID Geocode Match Files is the only United State data set that provides geographic information at the census tract/block numbering area level. A census tract/block numbering area is a small, relatively permanent area containing approximately 5,000 people. Usually census tracts are found in urban areas, while block-numbering areas are usually found in more rural regions. For every year that a head of household is in his prime earning years, 25 to 65 years old, the following variables were extracted from the PSID individual, family and Geocode Match Files:
• the percentage of blacks in the person's census tract or enumeration district,
• the MSA of residence,
• the year of the survey,
• the family's income to needs ratio,
• the education of the head of the household,
• the census region of residence,
• whether the family rented, owned its home or neither, and
• the race of the head of household.
The PSID constructs the income to needs ratio by dividing nominal family income by a measure of the poverty level based on the family's food needs expressed in 1968 dollars. The numerator was deflated to 1968 dollars using the January Consumer's Price Index from 1968 and the year in which the income was earned.
The education variable was converted to three dummy variables. High school is equal to one if a person has a high school degree or equivalent and has not received any college training. Some college is equal to one if a person has a high school degree and has received some college training but has not received a four-year degree. College is equal to one if a person has a four-year college Since the audit data reviewed applies only to discrimination against blacks, the sample is restricted to black and white head of households. A small number of individuals classified themselves as black and white in different survey years. These individuals were excluded from the sample.
Inference is restricted to heads of households who are observed both renting and owning a home in the same MSA while in the panel in order to avoid confounding the independent effect of homeownership on segregation with the effect of migration across MSAs. 
VI. A SIMPLE APPROACH
Some simple calculations of the effect of homeownership on segregation using the data set described in the previous section are presented in table 4. Row A gives the mean proportion of blacks in a black renter's neighborhood by educational attainment of the head of household. Row B
gives the mean proportion of blacks in a white renter's neighborhood by educational attainment of the head of household. Row C is Row A minus Row B, the segregation measure proposed in this paper, ∆(X), for renters. Rows D, E, and F are analogous to Rows A, B, and C but refer to homeowners. Row G, which is equal to Row C minus Row F, gives the change in segregation associated with homeownership for each educational group. The only conditioning variable (X) used to construct this table is the education of the head of household. As will be seen in Section VII, white renters with a high school degree, some college training and a college degree are 5 percent, 5 percent, and 6.5 percent respectively. In contrast to black renters, there is no clear relation between educational attainment and the racial composition of white renter's neighborhoods.
Row C reports the difference of Row A and Row B, which is the ∆(X) segregation measure.
The entries in this row indicate that segregation among renters declines as educational attainments increase. This decline is particularly steep for college educated individuals.
Rows D, E, and F repeat the same analysis as Rows A, B, and C but for homeowners instead of renters. Row D indicates that the isolation of black homeowners sharply declines with education.
Black homeowners with no high school diploma on average live in neighborhoods with 73 percent blacks compared to neighborhoods with on average 42.4 percent blacks for college-educated blacks.
The mean proportion of blacks in white homeowners' neighborhoods declines with education but this decline is minimal compared to the decline experienced by black homeowners. White homeowners with no high school diploma on average live in neighborhoods with 5.6 percent blacks compared to neighborhoods with on average 3.8 percent blacks for college graduates.
The difference in segregation between homeowners and renters is given in Row G, which is the difference of Row C (segregation among renters by educational attainment) and Row F (segregation among homeowners by educational attainment). In general, homeownership is associated with a decline in segregation but this effect is small or moderate for individuals without a four-year college degree. For individuals with no high school diploma, a high school diploma or some college training, homeownership is associated with a one to five percentage point decline in segregation. However, this effect is more pronounced for college graduates who on average experience a 10.7 percentage point decline in segregation when they move from a rental to a sales unit.
VII. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATES
A statistical model of the proportion of blacks in a person's census tract is used to construct the segregation measure (∆(X)) and the difference in difference (∆ r (X) -∆ h (X)) used to quantify the effect of discrimination on segregation. The model states that the proportion of blacks in a person's neighborhood is a function of a time effect, an MSA specific effect, whether an individual lives in the South, an individual's race, family income, the education of the head of household and the discrimination rate, which is captured by the housing tenure variable. In addition, an individual specific fixed effect is included in the model. 9 The fixed-effects specification was chosen over random effects because a Hausman specification test rejected the null hypothesis that the random effects and fixed-effects coefficients are identical. Under the assumption of constant preferences over time, this fixed effect can be interpreted as the propensity of an individual to live in a neighborhood with a high black proportion. Mathematically, the model is a linear probability 10 model for grouped data with fixed-effects and is given by
where b it is the proportion of blacks in a person's neighborhood, µ i is a fixed effect for each individual in the sample, γ t is a constant term for year t, MSA it is a dummy variable for each metropolitan area in the sample, X it is a 1 x 5 vector of socioeconomic variables including the family's income to needs ratio, the education of the head of household 11 and a dummy variable equal to one if a person resides in the southern census region, R it is a dummy variable equal to one if 9 The most general way to control for individual heterogeneity is by using fixed-effects. Unlike random effects, the use of fixed-effects does not require an assumption that individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the other right hand side variables. The fixed-effects model does have one major disadvantage. As mentioned previously, the coefficients on time invariant variables, such as the race of the head of household, are not identified. Despite this loss of information, the linearity assumption permits the calculation of ∆ r (X) -∆ h (X) as will be shown below.
person i rents at time t, B i is a dummy variable equal to one if person i is black, and e it ~ IID(0, σ ).
It is assumed that e it is uncorrelated with MSA it , γ t , X it , R it , B i and µ i .
2 e
Note that R it and B i have been interacted with X it in such a way as to allow white homeowners, white renters, black homeowners and black renters to have different coefficients on the socio-economic variables included in X it . For example, β 2 and β 5 parameterize the difference between the expected proportion of blacks in a white renter's neighborhood and a white homeowner's neighborhood. β 5 is the effect of renting common to all renters while β 2 is a vector of coefficients which allow the effect of renting to vary by education and income. β 3 and β 6 parameterize the effect of being black on the proportion of blacks in one's neighborhood. β 6 captures the effect common to all blacks while β 3 allows the effect of race to vary by education and income. β 4 and β 7 parameterizes the effect of being both black and a renter. β 7 captures the effect common to all black renters while β 4 allows that effect to vary by education and income. The chart below identifies the coefficients of the model, which belong to the four distinct groups considered in the above model.
Group Relevant coefficients
White homeowners Β 1
White renters β 1 , β 2 , β 5
Black homeowners β 1 , β 3 , β 6
Black renters β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 4 , β 5 , β 6 , β 7
Since blacks in rental units face a higher rate of discrimination than blacks in sales units the coefficients on the "Rent x Black" variables characterize the "discrimination effect." Notice that in 12 The grouped nature of the data induces heteroskedasticity in the model which can be corrected by constructing
and running weighted least squares regression on the equation above. The weights are constructed using predicted values from an unweighted estimation of the same equation. About 120 observations have negative predicted values. These are white individuals with high incomes living in metropolitan areas with small black populations. The weight used to correct for heteroskedasticity is not defined for a negative predicted value. For this reason a truncated predicted value is used instead of the actual predicted value to construct the weight. The truncated predicted value equals 0.0001 if the actual predicted value is less than 0.0001. The actual predicted value is used to construct the weight if it is greater than or equal to 0.0001. terms of the variables and coefficients of the empirical model above, ∆ r (X) can be expressed as a difference constructed by using the coefficients that pertain to black and white renters and ∆ h (X) can be expressed as a difference constructed by using the coefficients that pertain to black and white homeowners:
That is, in order to compute the difference in difference (∆ r (X) -∆ h (X)) which is the effect of the additional discrimination found in rental markets compared to sales markets on segregation, one may confine attention to the coefficients on the "Black x Rent" variables.
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The estimation results of the linear probability model for grouped data with fixed-effects are The cumulative effect of these coefficients on changes in racial segregation across rental and sales markets is shown in Table 6 . In this table, the predicted increases in racial segregation in rental markets compared to sales markets are presented for the four education groups and for three income to needs ratios for each education category. For instance, a black high school dropout with an income to needs ratio of one would expect to live in a neighborhood with four percentage points fewer blacks when he owns a home compared to when he rents. As can be readily seen in Table 6 , the "discrimination effect" decreases slightly with income but increases substantially with educational attainment. For all groups except high school dropouts, the size of the discrimination effect is large: 7-9 percentage points for high school graduates, 9-12 percentage points for those with some college training and 17-20 percentage points for those with four year college degrees.
VIII. COMPARING CROSS-SECTIONAL AND PANEL ESTIMATES
As noted in the introduction, previous research on racial segregation in housing has used cross-sectional data. A novel aspect of this paper is its use of panel data to study segregation. This section of the paper examines whether the panel nature of the PSID provides some benefit in the identification of the "discrimination effect."
In the previous section, a fixed effect model specification was chosen because a Hausman specification test indicated a statistically significant difference between fixed-effects and random effects coefficient estimates. The implication of this finding is that including between individual variation in an estimator of the "discrimination effect" 13 leads to biased coefficient estimates. The only type of variation found in cross-sectional data is variation between individuals and thus, crosssectional estimates of the impact of discrimination on segregation appear to be problematic. While the Hausman specification test shows that the bias induced by between persons variation is statistically significant, it remains to be seen whether this bias is quantitatively important.
To answer this question, the estimates of the "discrimination effect" derived from the fixed- section. However, the disadvantage of this comparison is the small sample size used in the model estimation.
These comparisons abstract from the other principle difference between existing crosssectional data sets, such as the decennial census, and a nationally representative panel such as the PSID-namely the level of detail available in variables that measure socio-economic status. Instead, the comparisons made in this section consider the effect of controlling for individual heterogeneity on the size and sign of estimates of the "discrimination effect" derived from models that contain the same variables as the fixed-effects model but no individual specific effects.
The two sets of estimates use a similar model specification and differ only by the sample used and the presence of time-specific dummy variables. Mathematically, the first model is given by
where b is the proportion of blacks in a person's neighborhood, MSA is a dummy variable for each metropolitan area in the sample, X is a 1 x 5 vector of socioeconomic variables including the family's income to needs ratio, the education of the head of household and a dummy variable equal to one if a person resided in the southern census region, R is a dummy variable equal to one if a person rents, B is a dummy variable equal to one if a person is black, and e ~ IID(0, σ ). It is assumed that e is uncorrelated with MSA, B, R, and X. Variability in neighborhood size induces heteroskedasticity in the model that can be corrected by constructing weights in the same fashion as before. The second model is the same as above without γ t and without time subscripts.
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The results from these two comparison models are found in table 7. The first three columns of table 7 reproduce table 6, while the next two columns add the percentage point changes in segregation implied by the coefficient estimates from the comparison models. The coefficient estimates of these two models are found in Appendix Tables 1 and 2 . As before, a positive number indicates that the extra discrimination found in rental markets is associated with an increase in segregation, while a negative number indicates that the extra discrimination in rental markets is associated with a decrease in segregation. Perhaps the most striking result found in both the full panel "cross-sectional" estimates and the 1980 cross-sectional estimates of the "discrimination effect" is that at least half of the estimates have the wrong sign. In these cases, dropping individual specific effects result in estimates that imply that increased discrimination is associated with lower levels of racial segregation. Furthermore, even in the cases where the discrimination effect has the correct sign, the estimates of the size of the effect appear to suffer from a persistent downward bias.
The size of the "discrimination effect" is always smaller in the full panel estimates with no fixedeffects when compared to the full panel estimates with fixed-effects. Similarly, the estimates of the "discrimination effect" derived from the 1980 cross-section are smaller than the fixed-effects estimates in 10 of the 12 cases presented in table 7. The pattern of cross-sectional estimates indicates that when individual heterogeneity is ignored no meaningful "discrimination effect" is found in the data. It is also important to note that on average, the fixed-effects estimates of the "discrimination effect" in table 7 are 9.8 percentage points higher than the two sets of cross-sectional estimates.
Based on these results, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 1980 cross-section, full panel with no fixed-effects and fixed-effects coefficient estimates imply dramatically different response of segregation to changes in the rate of discrimination. Failing to control for individual heterogeneity appears to result in a substantial downward bias in the estimated relationship between discrimination and racial segregation in housing, at least in the data used in this study.
IX. CONCLUSION
Social scientists commonly assume that a reduction in the housing discrimination rate would be associated with a large decrease in black-white segregation. Yet prior to this essay there has not been any direct evidence to support this belief. There is little doubt that a decrease in the discrimination rate would have some effect on segregation, but given the state of the current literature it would be impossible to deduce whether that effect would be large or small. This study is the first to quantify the relationship between a discrete change in the discrimination rate and a corresponding change in racial segregation in housing.
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Audit studies reveal that the rate of discrimination is higher in rental housing than in owneroccupied housing. Thus, the effect of racial discrimination on segregation is quantified by observing There are two striking features of these estimates. First, the effect of the additional discrimination in rental markets on racial segregation is not only statistically significant but, except for high school dropouts, substantial. Second, the size of this effect varies tremendously with educational status and to a lesser degree with income. At this time it is difficult to know what accounts for this variation in the "discrimination effect." One possible explanation may be that the housing search techniques used by lower education and high education blacks differ. In fact, Farley, Bianchi and Colasanto [1979] have found that blacks with higher educational attainments are more likely to utilize realtors than blacks with lower educational attainments. Nevertheless, this one study is merely suggestive, not conclusive. Given what is little is known about minority housing search techniques (and other possible factors that might interact with the discrimination rate to produce these effects), anything more than speculative explanation of this variation will have to be left to future research efforts.
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In the last part of this paper the empirical importance of controlling for individual heterogeneity is assessed by examining the difference in segregation across housing markets using two sets of cross-sectional estimates. The unobserved variable bias in the cross-sectional coefficient estimates is severe. In most cases examined, the cross-sectional coefficient estimates implied that the increased discrimination in rental markets compared to sales markets either decreased racial segregation or had no measurable effect. On average, the cross-sectional estimates of the "discrimination effect" were 9.8 percentage points lower than their fixed-effects counterparts. The size and persistence of this bias suggests that future research on the relationship between racial segregation and racial discrimination should emphasize the use of panel, as opposed to crosssectional, data.
Appendix I: The Choice of a Linear Probability Specification
The linearity assumption used in both these models, as opposed to a generalized linear model such as a logit or probit, is admittedly unrealistic but is maintained for three reasons. First, experimentation has revealed that alternatives such as a probit for grouped data do not produce reasonable predicted values for white respondents. Predicted values for whites from a probit for grouped data are tightly clustered about 0.1 percent, which is far from the sample mean of five percent.
Second, not only are these estimates unrealistically small, they are not responsive to changes in socio-economic variables. The effect of statistically significant coefficients on education and income variables are overwhelmed by the coefficients for whites, which do not vary with economic status. In effect using a probit for grouped data forces the researcher to ignore the variation in the percentage of blacks for whites when computing segregation.
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Third, the effect of discrimination on segregation is not identified in a generalized linear model with fixed-effects but is identified in a linear model with fixed-effects. A well known property of fixed-effects model is that parameters on time invariant variables, such as the black dummy variable, are not identified. In the linear model it is not necessary to know the coefficient on the black dummy variable in order to calculate ∆ r (X) -∆ h (X). This difference can be calculated simply by summing and subtracting the appropriate coefficients. However, this is not the case for a generalized linear model with fixed-effects. In a generalized linear model, the difference in two predicted values depends not only on the size of the coefficients on the variables that change but also depends on the level of the constant terms taken as arguments to the non-linear link function.
To see this, consider a generalized linear model with fixed-effects
where g is a non-linear link function such as a logit or normal cdf, µ i is the fixed effect, B i is a dummy variable equal to one if person i is black and R it is a dummy variable equal to one if person i rents at time t. For each individual µ i + B i β 1 is identified but not β 1 . One cannot ignore these terms because the difference in predicted values for renters and homeowners will depend on the level of this intercept. For instance assume that β 1 = β 2 = 1 and that g is the standard normal cdf. Then segregation among renters is given by g(1 + 1) -g(1) = 0.977 -0.841 = 0.136. Now suppose β 1 = 0.1. Then segregation among renters is given by g(0.1 + 1) -g(1) = 0.844 -0.841 = 0.003. As such, defining a segregation measure which can be generalized to the population at large is impossible because one cannot abstract from unique individual effects. Tables   Appendix Table 1 (Wienk, et al. [1979] ) 0.00 HUD, 1989 (Yinger, [1991 0.07 Local housing authorities, 1980s (Galster, [1990]) 0.00 Above studies considered jointly 0.00 Table entries are the average percentage of blacks in a person's neighborhood by race and educational attainment. Segregation is measured as the difference in the mean neighborhood black proportion for blacks and whites with the same educational attainment. Row C = Row A -Row B gives segregation for renters. Row F = Row D -Row E gives segregation for homeowners. The means reported are unweighted. The change in segregation associated with homeownership is the difference in difference, Row C -Row F. 
Appendix II: Supplemental
